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The inertia of most people in affluent Western nations in the face of the corruption of 
the core institutions of their democracies, including their universities, their 
disempowerment, the plundering of public wealth, growing economic injustice and 
economic insecurity, environmental degradation and the threat of a global ecological 
collapse, has impelled a search for explanations, and in doing so, has forced people to 
confront the nihilism of modern civilization. It appears that the devaluation of the 
highest values, and of life itself, and the consequent loss of meaning in people’s lives, is 
having practical consequences. Nihilism threatens our liberty, the future of civilization 
and even the global ecosystem which sustains the conditions for life. The papers 
collected in the present edition were not solicited; nevertheless they can all be seen as 
grappling with and attempting to overcome this nihilism, and as such form a coherent 
body of work. There was a second group of papers submitted this year united by their 
concern for the future of philosophy. These will be published shortly in another 
edition. However, even the problematic state of philosophy can only be understood in 
relation to nihilism. Nihilism is now so totally taken for granted by most people that 
the discourse through which the source of this nihilism could be identified and 
challenged is being ignored and undermined by those who now control the funding 
and management of education and research. Philosophy itself is becoming a victim of 
nihilism.  
The first paper in this edition by David Storey, ‘Nihilism, Nature, and the 
Collapse of the Cosmos’ is timely, providing a much needed history of the concept of 
nihilism and of those who have recognized it and struggled against it. It shows that the 
term was coined and the problem was recognized long before Nietzsche, and the 
notion was explicitly formulated as an issue by F.H. Jacobi in 1799. While it has taken 
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many forms and been understood in different ways, Storey sees the main source of 
nihilism in a form of scientific naturalism (essentially, what Alfred North Whitehead 
referred to as ‘scientific materialism’) that has drained meaning, value and purpose 
from nature. In conclusion Storey endorses the project of environmental philosophers 
to ‘re-enchant the world’. 
 The philosopher who most appreciated and responded most forcefully to Jacobi’s 
diagnosis of nihilism was F.W. J. Schelling, a philosopher who is usually identified 
with the Idealism that Jacobi was attacking. The second paper by Arran Gare, ‘From 
Kant to Schelling to Process Metaphysics: On the Way to Ecological Civilization’ 
notes the influence of Jacobi on Schelling and argues that in fact Schelling strove to 
overcome Idealism, and succeeded, laying the foundation for the modern tradition of 
process metaphysics. Schelling, who had an enormous influence on subsequent 
science and mathematics as well as the philosophy of culture and culture generally, 
under the influence of J.G. Herder and Wolfgang Goethe, had already begun the 
process of re-enchanting nature called for by Storey. Schelling also called for a new 
philosophical ‘religion’ (the original meaning of which was ‘re-connection’, from re- = 
‘again’ + ligare = ‘to join, to connect, to bind’), transcending the parochialism of 
Christianity and creating a new world consciousness. Schelling’s work as an ‘event of 
truth’, to use Alain Badiou’s terms, resulted in a cascade of events of truth, providing 
the basis for re-enchanting nature, for overcoming nihilism and for creating a global 
civilization that has inspired directly or indirectly a vast range of philosophers, 
scientists, mathematicians, artists, writers, environmentalists and political activists. He 
laid the philosophical and cultural foundations for the ecological civilization now 
being called for by Chinese environmentalists.  
These two papers provide a background against which the importance of the 
remaining papers in this edition can be appreciated. The question that must arise 
from an appreciation of Schelling’s work is why the traditions of thought he inspired 
did not coalesce and replace our nihilistic culture. There can be a number of 
explanations for this, but a major insight into it is offered by Gennady Shkliarevsky in 
‘The God Debates and the Limits of Reason’. Shkliarevsky has shown that the so-
called war of science and religion is for the most part fake. While on each side of the 
divide there have been challenges to the other side, notably Richard Dawkins’ attack 
on religion, more commonly mainstream science and mainstream religion have 
accommodated themselves to each other. The outcome has been a stunting of both. 
Mainstream science has eschewed the more profound questions about the nature of 
the cosmos and our place within it, dismissing such questions as religious questions, 
while apologists for Christianity have taken refuge in the notion of faith and eschewed 
 COSMOS AND HISTORY 3 
efforts to comprehend the world rationally, claiming that such enquiry is best left to 
science. Shkliarevsky wonders whether the two sides of this opposition will have the 
will and wisdom to overcome their subsequent stagnation.  
While the debased view of nature of scientific materialism is the ultimate source of 
the nihilism of the modern age, Jacobi first saw nihilism in the obverse of this, the 
effort to compensate for this view of nature by founding our beliefs and values on the 
reflective reasoning of the subject. He condemned Idealism. In various forms, 
Idealism is still a part of our culture and underlies the problems addressed in the 
following two papers by Joseph Morrill Kirby and Sami Pihlström. In ‘The Quest for 
Pleasure and the Death of Life’, Kirby has confronted the argument that it is 
irrational to care about what might happen to the human species after one’s own 
death. As Kirby points out, this became a live issue with the 1972 Club of Rome 
report, The Limits to Growth. We must now make decisions about whether we are to 
sacrifice our present well-being for the sake of people in the future yet unborn. The 
conclusion that there is no justification for this follows from interpreting the meaning 
of life purely in terms of the pursuit of pleasure and the avoidance of pain; that is, 
subjective sensations. Engaging with the defence of this by Amien Kacou, Kirby 
reveals the weakness in this view of life, revealing the more primordial place the 
notion of justice has in our comprehension of meaning, and the ontological 
significance of this. However, this by itself does not justify the sacrifice of the poor of 
the world for the future of humanity. A corollary of this argument is that if we wish to 
save the future, then it will be necessary to strive for justice in the present. 
In ‘Guilt: Facing the Problem of Ethical Solipsism’, Pihlström also struggles with 
the opposition between subjective experience and the quest for an objective view of 
reality; however, his focus is on the constitutive role played by the emotion of guilt in 
our moral life. The problem with granting a central place in our moral life to guilt is 
that it can lead to a form of ethical solipsism. Exploring the role of guilt in moral life 
through a number of ethical thinkers (Fyodor Dostoyevsky and the literary theorist 
Tzvetan Todorov, as well as philosophers) and problematic situations, Pihlström 
shows the seriousness of this issue. When considered against the backdrop of our 
limited knowledge and the potentially immense consequences of our actions, it can 
lead to the view that no one ever does the right thing, and this in turn can lead to 
moral nihilism, or even metaphysical nihilism. The argument imagined (but not 
defended) by Pihlström, is to show that what is really deep in moral life is our way of 
being in the world, and this involves both historical and cosmic dimensions.  
Engaging with another and closely related dualism, a complementary conclusion 
is reached by Hana Owen in her paper: ‘Bakhtinian Thought and the Defence of 
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Narrative: Overcoming Universalism and Relativism’. Taking as her point of 
departure the opposition between the modernist’s project of totalizing experience and 
excluding difference and postmodernists who have attacked this and glorified 
difference, Owen draws on the narrative theory of Mikhail Bakhtin to point the way 
to a more inclusive and creative understanding of humanity while avoiding the 
postmodern tendency to isolate and fragment. Owen reveals the profundity of the 
work of Bakhtin (who, as Miroslav Orel showed, was strongly influenced by 
Schelling)1 and the continuing relevance of his ideas. Bakhtin and members of his 
circle had identified the root of the oppressive tendencies in modernity that were later 
rediscovered by poststructuralists such as Jacques Derrida, and worked towards a 
conception of life, ethics and politics that transcends both the one-eyed reason of 
modernism embraced by neo-classical economists and techno-scientists and the 
scepticism and relativism of the deconstructive postmodernism embraced by 
establishment figures in the arts and the humanities. From the perspective provided 
by Bakhtin and his circle, modernism and deconstructive post-modernism, like 
scientism and mainstream religion and subjectivism and objectivism, are shown to be 
different sides of the same coin. 
Another manifestation of the opposition between universalism and the 
acknowledgement of difference is the opposition between cosmopolitanism and 
concern with concrete particularity. Paul Healy in ‘Situated Cosmopolitanism, and 
the Conditions of its Possibility: Transformative Dialogue as a Response to the 
Challenge of Difference’ takes as his point of departure Habermas’ effort to solve this 
problem through his discourse model of cosmopolitism. This model upholds 
universality while empowering us as citizens and authors of the laws and policies by 
which we are governed. Drawing on Seyla Benhabib’s distinction between the 
‘generalized’ other and ‘concrete’ other, Healy argues that Habermas’ theory of 
discourse still does not give an adequate place to difference; it will have to be 
supplemented to give a place to the specific histories, identities and life experiences of 
diversely situated others. This produces a theory of discourse that gives a place to 
disagreement and embraces difference as a resource rather than a barrier to 
consensus.  
 Martin Heidegger, like Bakhtin, was strongly influenced by Schelling and was 
centrally concerned to overcome the nihilism of modernity. However, unlike Bakhtin, 
Heidegger gave no place to laughter. Tziovanis Georgakis in ‘Tradition as 
Gelotopoesis: An Essay on the Hermeneutics of Laughter in Martin Heidegger’ 
                                                     
1 Miroslav Orel, ‘F. W. J. Schelling's and M. M. Bakhtin's Process Thinking,’ Concrescence, Vol. 3, 2002: 
http://concrescence.org/index.php/ajpt/article/view/119, 
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addresses this lacunae. Through a careful explication of Heidegger’s Being and Time 
along with other, later writings, Georgakis argues that the question of laughter 
sanctions the question of the meaning of being and shows how it is laughter that 
brings forth meaning. It is also by laughing at Heidegger and other philosophers that 
their positive significance can be affirmed – not as oracles but as thinkers within a 
tradition of other thinkers and poets, avoiding objectification, formalization and 
standardization in understanding their work.   
The last paper of this edition by Michel Weber, ‘On a Certain Blindness in 
Political Matters’, is also a bridge the next edition of Cosmos & History on the future of 
philosophy. Weber argues that ‘unless philosophy adopts a radical empiricist 
standpoint and seeks the uttermost generalities, it cannot differentiate itself from yet 
another form of limited expertise and become useless.’ When it does do its work 
properly, philosophy moves to a radically progressive politics. What has this to do 
with overcoming nihilism? In promoting radical empiricism along with the quest for 
the utmost generalities, Weber pinpoints a major source of nihilism and clarifies what 
is required to overcome it. Radical empiricism, explicitly defended as such by William 
James and embraced by Whitehead and Edmund Husserl, has its roots in the work of 
J.G. Hamann, Herder, Goethe, Jacobi and Schelling. These philosophers recognized 
the sleight of hand of Newtonian science which, while claiming knowledge superior to 
and independent of metaphysics by virtue of its empiricism, in fact refused to 
acknowledge the reality of most of what is experienced. It is through the adoption and 
imposition of blinkers on experience without acknowledging them that meaning has 
been drained from the world and from people’s lives. The concern with the utmost 
generalities is a quest to recover and extend the experience that has been lost. Weber 
shows the practical consequences of this: a politics that takes into account what has 
previously been excluded, leading to more concern for fellow human beings, for other 
forms of life, and eventually, for the entire biosphere. And it leads us towards the 
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